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THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND CHILD PROTECTION
Shelley Kierstead*
I. INTRODUCTION
An intricate weave of public/private, legal/emotional, and inter-disciplinary
elements make child protection law capable of attracting rich analyses from a
therapeutic jurisprudence perspective.' This article aims to contribute in a small
way to the extensive potential discussions in this area by considering some avenues
that professionals working within the child welfare system can adopt to facilitate
the emotional well-being of the parties involved while respecting the legal system
values that apply to the regime.2 Part II briefly introduces the child protection
regime's intricate blend of elements. Part III advocates for preventive lawyering
and therapeutic judging as vehicles for maximizing therapeutic outcomes for both
parents and children involved in child protection matters. Part IV canvasses the
complexity introduced by the variety of professionals involved in child protection
cases, and their tendency to work from different conceptual bases and with
different "vocabularies." It calls for a stronger understanding of the theoretical
underpinnings of the array of professionals regularly involved in child protection
matters, and better communication among these professionals so that they do not
inadvertently end up working at cross purposes. The concluding part of the article
offers preliminary suggestions for teachers and child protection professionals
aimed at maximizing the therapeutic aspects of what is undoubtedly one of the
most devastating areas of law to parents and their children.
II. CHILD PROTECTION: A COMPLEX BLEND OF RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
Child protection law clearly involves families. And yet, it does not give rise to
the private type of dispute that involves parents negotiating child-related matters in
a "typical" family law post-separation scenario.3 Rather, this area engages a
significant public law element-one that involves state intervention aimed at
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, Ontario.
I. Susan L. Brooks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law in Child Welfare Proceedings: A
Family Systems Approach, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 951, 951 (1999) ("Child welfare law provides a rich
context for exploring the application of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) and preventive law principles."). Brooks
went on to outline the importance of family systems theory, with its focus on mutual interaction and shared
responsibility of family members, to effective child welfare practice.
2. Therapeutic jurisprudence is an approach to legal analysis and legal action that seeks to maximize well-
being (often emotional) for those involved in the law, without sacrificing other legal system values. See DAVID B.
WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991) (for a number of early key works
on the concept of Therapeutic Jurisprudence).
3. Sometimes, however, parties involved in child protection proceedings can be simultaneously going
through the separation process.
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protecting children from parental behavior that harms them or places them at risk
of harm.4 As part of his in-depth look at judicial determinations of custody
disputes, Robert Mnookin described the most important distinction between the
child protection function and private custody resolution function as lying in their
relationship to the distribution of power between the family and the state:
Legal standards for private dispute settlement guide judicial
resolution of a private controversy. In this instance, authoritative
resolution does not in itself expand the state's role with regard to
child-rearing. Legal standards for the child-protection function, on
the other hand, act both to define when government may intrude
into the family and to control child-rearing through coercion.
Defining the appropriate scope of the child-protection function is
therefore necessarily related to profound questions of political and
moral philosophy concerning the proper relationship of children to
their family, and the'family to the state.'
The level of state intervention in family functioning represented by child
protection proceedings heightens the concern for ensuring due process for the
parties whose interests are at stake. 6 The distinct nature of child protection matters
necessarily embodies a tension between family autonomy and the protection of
4. See Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 1, s. 37(2) (Can.) [hereinafter CFSA] (for the
list of descriptors of a "child in need of protection").
5. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 265 (1975) (emphasis added).
6. The Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the concern for due process in New Brunswick (Minister of
Health and Community Services) v. G.(J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (Can.), a case dealing with an indigent mother's
fight to publicly funded counsel in a child protection matter where she was at risk of losing custody of her children
for a prolonged period.
[80] In proceedings as serious and complex as these, an unrepresented parent will ordinarily
need to possess superior intelligence or education, communication skills, composure, and
familiarity with the legal system in order to effectively present his or her case. There is no
evidence in Athey J.'s decision or the record to suggest that the appellant possessed such
capacities.
[81] In light of these factors, I find that the appellant needed to be represented by counsel
for there to have been a fair determination of the children's best interests. Without the
benefit of counsel, the appellant would not have been able to participate effectively at the
hearing, creating an unacceptable risk of error in determining the children's best interests
and thereby threatening to violate both the appellant's and her children's right to security of
the person.
In a later case dealing with the validity of warrantless apprehensions, the Supreme Court of Canada stated:
[T]he removal of a child from parental care by way of apprehension may give rise to great
emotional and psychological distress for parents and constitutes a serious intrusion into the
family sphere. Since s. 21 (1) of the [Manitoba Child and Family Services] Act provides for
the apprehension of a child from parental care, it contemplates an infringement of the right
to security of the person which can only be carried out in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.
Winnipeg Child & Family Servs. v. K.L.B., 2000 S.C.C. 48, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 519, para. 87 (Can.).
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children. Due process considerations, then, should apply to both the adults and the
children who are at the very center of child protection cases. There is a growing
body of literature focused on the latter issue, often with a specific focus on
children's participation in legal matters affecting them.7 This article does not
engage with that body of literature, but rather is focused primarily on therapeutic
jurisprudence concepts as they relate to parents. Of course, it is impossible to
separate the concern for children's well-being that is embedded within this
analysis.8
The complex blend of rights and interests involved in child protection matters
invites consideration of an equally intricate set of legal and therapeutic elements. A
number of authors have argued for greater use of interest-based dispute resolution
in matters involving personal relationships, family dynamics, and children's
interests. 9 There is widespread agreement that the family litigation process often
serves to exacerbate stress and conflict among family members.' Given that child
protection matters involve the support and nurturing of ongoing family
relationships, similar caveats about the anxieties associated with the litigation
process certainly come into play. And yet, to the extent that child protection
matters pit parents against the state in a contest about who will be entitled to parent
the child(ren) at issue,"1 significant due process rights arise. These cases also give
rise to an interesting power dynamic, particularly in light of statistics that suggest a
significant number of child protection cases involve parents of low socio-economic
status' 2 and correspondingly little access to resources. While informal processes
7. For one recent analysis, see Rachel Birnbaum & Nicholas Bala, Judicial Interviews with Children in
Custody andAccess Cases: Comparing Experiences in Ontario and Ohio, 24 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 300 (2010).
8. The CFSA, supra note 4, makes it clear that the promotion of children's best interests, protection, and
well-being is the paramount objective of the legislation. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
9. See Marsha B. Freeman, Love Means Always Having.to Say You're Sorry: Applying the Realities of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Family Law', 17 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 215 (2008) and Sfisan Daicoff, Collaborative
Law: A New Tool for the Lawyer's Toolkit, U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 113 (2009).
10. See M.K. Pruett & T.D. Jackson, Perspectives on the Divorce Process: Parental Perceptions of the
Legal System and its Impact on Family Relations, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 18 (2001) (for an account of
divorce clients' perceptions of the stress associated with litigation).
11. In New Brunswick v. G.(J.), supra note 6, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the significance of
the presumption that parents will be entitled to raise their children. At para. 61, the Court stated:
I have little doubt that state removal of a child from parental custody pursuant to the state's
parens patriae jurisdiction constitutes a serious interference with the psychological integrity
of the parent. The parental interest in raising and caring for a child is, .... "an individual
interest of fundamental importance in our society". Besides the obvious distress arising from
the loss of companionship of the child, direct state interference with the parent-child
relationship, through a procedure in which the relationship is subject to state inspection and
review, is a gross intrusion into a private and intimate sphere.
In the United States context, parents' right to care and custody of their children has been recognized under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Marsha B. Freeman, Lions Among Us: How Our Child
Protective Agencies Harm the Children and Destroy the Families They Aim to Help, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 39, 53
(2006); see also Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due Process and Parental Rights: From Meyer v. Nebraska to
Troxel v. Granville, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 71 (2006).
12. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, CANADIAN INCIDENCE STUDY OF REPORTED
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT-2008 MAJOR FINDINGS 55-56 (2010) (this report released by Canada's Public
Health Agency reported that thirty-three percent of substantiated child protection investigations involved children
whose families received Employment Insurance, social assistance, and other benefits as their primary source of
Fall 2011
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undoubtedly hold potential to provide parties with a more direct "voice" in the
resolution process, 13 the transparency of a court proceeding 14 may help to ensure
that due process concerns are addressed, particularly in cases where parents are at a
very real risk of permanently losing the right to parent their children (and, of
course, children are at a very real risk of permanently losing the right to be
parented by their current parents).
There is some debate about the extent to which due process safeguards are
impacted by child protection mediation 5 and other informal dispute resolution
processes.' 6 Certainly, both mediation and family group conferencing have been
widely recognized as "help[ing] professionals [to] engage families and children,
increase the focus on family and community strengths, promote collaboration
instead of adversarial relationships, and help children leave the foster care system
and find permanency in a timely manner.""
The discussions about the range of possible dispute resolution mechanisms
reflect the mixed objectives of most child welfare statutes-promoting best
interests of the child and supporting the integrity of the family unit. For example,
the Child and Family Services Act' 8 of Ontario provides as follows:
income. Ten percent of families relied on part-time work, multiple jobs, or seasonal employment. Two percent of
families reported no reliable source of income, and eleven percent of families in substantiated cases were also
living in public housing.).
13. Gregory Firestone, Empowering Parents in Child Protection Mediation: Challenges and Opportunities,
47 FAM. CT. REV. 98 (2009) (arguing for the need to empower parents to be active participants in child protection
mediation so that issues of concern can be dealt with in a timely way); see also Marilou Giovannucci & Karen
Largent, A Guide to Effective Child Protection Mediation: Lessons from 25 Years of Practice, 47 FAM. CT. REV.
38 (2009).
14. Trevor C. W. Farrow, Privatizing our Public Civil Justice System, 9 NEWS & VIEWS ON CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM 16 (2006) (articulating the importance of transparency within the civil justice system).
15. Marvin M. Bernstein, Child Protection Mediation: Its Time Has Arrived, 16 CAN. FAM. L.Q. 73 (1998)
(arguing the view that mediation can increase parental bargaining power without sacrificing the parents' due
process rights, while taking the position that the determination of whether a child is in need of protection cannot
be mediated).
16. Jane C. Murphy, Revitalizing the Adversary System in Family Law, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 891, 909 (2010).
While recognizing that in some cases, mediation (and other informal processes) can empower parties:
Perhaps an even more troubling example of risks posed by mediation in the face of disabling
power imbalance is family conferencing in child welfare cases .... [Tihe attorneys' role in
family conferencing is as ill-defined and limited as in divorce and custody mediations. And
these cases are often marked by intimate partner violence and parties with limited education
and resources. All these circumstances create risks that a parent, most often the mother, will
"suppress her point of view in order to achieve agreement," and not benefit from available
statutory or constitutional protections.
17. Kelly Browe Olson, Family Group Conferencing and Child Protection Mediation: Essential Tools for
Prioritizing Family Engagement in Child Welfare Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 53, 53 (2009); see also Susan M.
Chandler & Marilou Giovannucci, Family Group Conferences: Transforming Traditional Child Welfare Policy
and Practice, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 216 (2004); Paul Adams & Susan M. Chandler, Responsive Regulation in Child
Welfare: Systemic Challenges to Mainstreaming the Family Group Conference, 31 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 93
(2004); and Jeanette Elizabeth Schmid & Shoshana Pollack, Developing Shared Knowledge: Group Family
Conferencing as a Means of Negotiating Power in the Child Welfare System, 21:3 PRACTICE 175 (2009).
18. CFSA, supra note 4.
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Paramount purpose
(1) The paramount purpose of this Act is to promote the best
interests, protection and well being of children.
Other purposes
(2) The additional purposes of this Act, so long as they are
consistent with the best interests, protection and well being of
children, are:
1. To recognize that while parents may need help in caring for
their children, that help should give support to the autonomy
and integrity of the family unit and, wherever possible, be
provided on the basis of mutual consent.
2. To recognize that the least disruptive course of action that is
available and is appropriate in a particular case to help a child
should be considered.
This combination of elements provides serious challenges for those involved in
child protection work-including legislators, lawyers, social workers, mediators,
and judges. This article places the spotlight primarily on the work of lawyers and
judges in facing these challenges. And, while accepting that non-court processes
have inherent therapeutic value for many families, the current work suggests that
even in cases where the court process is used in whole or in part to resolve a
matter, 19 there is potential to maximize therapeutic possibilities throughout the
process. The responsibility for maximizing this potential lies squarely with the
professionals who administer the system.
III. PREVENTIVE AND CLIENT-CENTERED LAWYERING AND JUDGING
For legal advocates working with child protection matters, concepts such as
preventive lawyering,20 which looks at ways to prevent legal risks from becoming
legal problems, and client-centered lawyering, are particularly relevant. The latter
approach
has its source in a perspective that legal problems typically raise both
legal and non-legal concerns for clients, that collaboration between
19. Id. at s. 51.1. The CFSA allows for a combination of processes to occur after formal protection
proceedings have been commenced:
At any time during a proceeding under this Part, the court may, in the best interests of the
child and with the consent of the parties, adjourn the proceeding to permit the parties to
attempt through a prescribed method of alternative dispute resolution to resolve any dispute
between them with respect to any matter that is relevant to the proceeding.
20. See Susan Daicoff, Making Law Therapeutic for Lawyers: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law,
and the Psychology of Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 811 (1999); see also Susan Daicoff, Reclaiming
Meaning in the Practice of Law: The Comprehensive Law Movement, 19 TOURo L. REV. 825 (2004) (for a
discussion of preventive law as a vector of the comprehensive law movement).
Fall 2011
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attorneys and clients is likely to enhance the effectiveness of
problem solving, and that clients ordinarily are in the best position to
make important decisions.
21
One of the justifications for client-centered lawyering rests with the
proposition that the extent to which solutions generated within the lawyer-client
relationship are viewed as successful by clients is directly related to how well they
respond to the client's concern about non-legal consequences.22 A hallmark of
client-centeredness is the ability to understand and respond to clients' feelings
without being required to play the role of psychologist or social worker.
23
Laypersons are, understandably, not familiar with the various professionals and
professional roles involved in the child protection regime. Failure to understand
matters such as the purpose and mechanics of supervised access visits, parental
capacity assessments, and judicial case conferences, can create significant
uncertainty for parents.24 This uncertainty can lead to anxiety, fear, and
depression.25 Therefore, it is important to clarify process details to clients. Further,
to the extent that the documents prepared for a case can be clear and unambiguous,
and can reflect the client's voice (for example, through the affidavits that support
his or her position), clients may feel some sense of control regarding the
information package that is being created with and for them.26 In an era where
public (legal aid) funding is limited, and where many child protection cases involve
clients who rely on public funding, taking the time to explain procedural details
may seem to be an unnecessary luxury. But it is an essential step toward working
with truly informed clients who are proactively engaged in their own matters.
A key aspect of successful client engagement in the child protection process
involves careful listening. It is obvious that lawyers must listen to clients' stories to
get an immediate sense of the appropriate next "step" in the process.27 From a
therapeutic jurisprudence perspective, there is, I suggest, both a more nuanced
aspect of listening to clients, and a requirement flowing from this "listening"
21. DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, SUSAN C. PRICE & PAUL R. TREMBLAY, LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 3 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS].
22. Id. at 5.
23. Id. at 11.
24. AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND
MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (1997) (examining the disconnect created between lawyers and clients when the
latter were not fully informed about the divorce process).
25. James P. Felstiner, Child Welfare Hearings from an Unfamiliar Perspective, in CANADIAN CHILD
WELFARE LAW: CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND THE STATE 306-09 (Nicholas Bala, Joseph P. Hornick & Robin Vogl
eds., 1991).
26. See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 122 (1984) (This type of "client
information control" is referred to within social cognition literature); Sumner J. Sydeman, Michele Cascardi,
Norman G. Poythress & Lee M. Ritterband, Procedural Justice in the Context of Civil Commitment: A Critique of
Tyler's Analysis, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 207, 211 (1997); see generally Michele Cascardi, Norman G.
Poythress & Alicia Hall, Procedural Justice in the Context of Civil Commitment-An Analogue Study 18 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 731 (2000) (on the topic of procedural justice theory and social cognition).
27. THERESA ROE LUND & JENNIFER L. RENNE, CHILD SAFETY: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS
(2009) (for checklists that aim to assist with the assessment of appropriate steps to take), availahle at
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/initiatives/protectingchildren/CPTAB/docs/mtgs/201 2011 7/ABAChildSafetyManualfina
ldraft.pdf.
Vol. 17, No. I
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exercise. The more nuanced aspect of listening involves listening not only to
facilitate an assessment of where the facts fit within the legal "theory of the case"1
28
being developed, but also to gain an in-depth understanding of what motivates the
client.
Understanding client motivations can not only help lawyers to refer clients to
more appropriate support services; it can also allow them to inform clients about
which motivations are likely to add support to their position and which are likely to
be either neutral or detrimental to their position. Where clients seem focused on
motivations that are not likely to be helpful to their child, for example, it will be a
key part of the lawyer's role to encourage them to adopt a more child-centered
focus.
While lawyers' work is critical to the positive progression of a child protection
case, judges can also play a critical role in fostering therapeutically positive
outcomes in these matters. With the growing prevalence of judicial case
management within child protection regimes, such opportunities abound. First, the
judge who manages proceedings up to the (unlikely) point of trial29 has several
opportunities to hear, encourage, and collaborate with parents. The facilitative
scope of the judicial role in case-managed proceedings may provide a positive
balance of (both parent and child) interest-based proceedings and protection of due
process. One judge has commented:
In recent years, I have found that a judge-mediated case conference
can be an effective alternative to traditional approaches for
deciding child protection cases. . . .Because a judge is not a
mediator ... the judge still has a responsibility to intervene if the
"resolution" does not respect the law protecting children. 30
Judges' verbal messages to clients during meetings can have a. significant
impact. It has been argued that judicial suggestions are often perceived as judicial
requirements. 31 Assuming the validity of this assertion, it is not difficult to see how
encouragement by a judge to continue with a parenting course or anger
management program may be highly motivational to parties. Listening to their
concerns, achievements, and set-backs with a lens focused on moving toward the
desired goal (generally of family reunification) can provide part of a critical
network of support that parents in vulnerable circumstances may desperately need.
28. Alfred A. Mamo, Getting a Family Case to Trial, 25 CAN. FAM. L.Q. 17, 17 (2006). The theory of the
case is the lawyer's decision about how "legal principles can be used to interpret for the Court your client's story."
29. CANADA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CANADA'S SYSTEM OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/
dept-min/pub/just/08.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
30. Thomas Gove, Reflections on Child Protection-Looking for the Best Available Outcomes, in
CANADIAN CHILD WELFARE LAW: CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND THE STATE 430 (Nicholas Bala, Michael K. Zapf, R.
James Williams, Robin Vogl & Joseph P. Hornick eds., 2d ed. 2004).
31. See Andrew Schepard & Stephen W. Schlissel, Planning for P.E.A.C.E.: The Development of Court-
Connected Education Programs for Divorcing and Separating Families, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 845 (1994) (noting
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Such supportive judicial approaches have been found to assist parties within the
context of drug courts. As Michael S. King has noted, an exploratory study found
that defendants in drug courts who received the most supportive comments from
judges were more likely to complete treatment programs than defendants who
received fewer supportive comments.32
Judges' words have potential impact from another important perspective.
Unfortunately, despite the best efforts of parties and professionals involved in a
child protection matter, there may be a decision at the end of the process that a
child must be removed permanently from his or her parents' care. When this is the
outcome, its rationale will be delivered in the form of a written judgment. The
wording of the judgment has the potential for a great deal of therapeutic impact-
for both parents and, I argue, children.
Others have written about the therapeutic implications of judgment writing,
albeit in different contexts. Bruce Winick and Amy D. Ronner, for example,
discussed the anti-therapeutic effects of the Per Curiam Affirmance (PCA), where
an appeal court accepts the ruling of a lower court without discussing how it'
reached its conclusion.33 Drawing upon studies that establish the psychological
benefit to litigants of feeling "heard" within the legal process, 34 the authors argued
that a recital of the facts, and a concise listing of the arguments made, along with a
brief indication of the reason for the dismissal, 35 would provide this sense of voice
to unsuccessful appellants.
Nathalie Des Rosiers has also examined written judgments from a therapeutic
jurisprudence perspective. She analyzed two different judgments rendered by the
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in difficult constitutional cases involving
questions relating to the Province of Quebec's potential secession from Canada.36
Des Rosiers argued that as opposed to rendering a decision framed in right-wrong
terminology, when dealing with minority-majority conflicts, the court should
"becom[e] more process-oriented listeners, translators, educators and, if possible,
facilitators. 37 She compared the SCC's decisions in Quebec Veto Reference38 and
32. Michael S. King, Restorative Justice, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rise of Emotionally
Intelligent Justice, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 1096, 1120 (2008). King refers to the studies in Scott R. Senjo & Leslie
A. Leip, Testing and Developing Theory in Drug Court: A Four-Part Logit Model to Predict Program
Completion, 12 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 66 (2001) and Scott R. Senjo & Leslie A. Leip, Testing Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Theory: An Empirical Assessment of the Drug Court Process, 3(1) W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. (2001),
available at http://wcr.sonoma.edu/v3n I/senjo.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
33. Amy D. Ronner & Bruce J. Winick, Silencing the Appellant's Voice: The Antitherapeutic Per Curiam
Affirmance, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 499 (2000).
34. See LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 2 1.
35. Ronner & Winick, supra note 33, at 506. The wording, suggests the authors, could be as brief as the
following: "While we understand the contentions made by the appellant and that he or she feels that the decision
below was erroneous, under our law we must defer to the discretion of the trial judge in matters such as these, and
therefore, for the reasons set forth in the appellee's brief, we must affirm."
36. Nathalie Des Rosiers, From Telling to Listening: A Therapeutic Analysis of the Role of Courts in
Minority-Majority Conflicts, 37 CT. REV. 54 (2000).
37. Id. at 54.
38. Reference Re Amendment to the Canadian Constitution, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793 (Can.).
Vol. 17, No. I
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Re Secession of Quebec39 to illustrate how it adopted a more therapeutic "process-
oriented listener" approach to drafting its decision in the latter case.
4 °
Des Rosiers first analyzed the language and structure of the Quebec Veto
Reference and argued that the SCC failed to adopt a therapeutic perspective
because it did not acknowledge the uncertainty and complexity of the issue before
it, did not acknowledge Quebec's voice, and did not frame the debate in a helpful
way.4 She contrasted that case with the more recent decision in Re Secession of
Quebec where the SCC explicitly recognized the complexity of the issues at stake,
and used a tone sympathetic to Quebec's sensitivities. 42 The author argued that by
adopting this therapeutic approach, the SCC was able to effectively help
participants come to grips with the frailties of their position.43
Applying a similar approach to the child protection context has the potential to
yield therapeutic benefits. A negative judgment in a child protection matter can, for
example, acknowledge parents' strengths and positive motivations. Inclusion of
this information has the potential of providing the parent with the comfort that their
efforts, and usually their love for the child, were recognized, even though the
frailties of their position have lead to them ultimately being found unable to
continue caring for their child. The following concluding paragraphs from a
judgment 44 rendered by an Ontario court in a recent case where Crown Wardship
45
with no entitlement to access being granted to the children's mother illustrate the
kind of therapeutic approach advocated for within this work:
Conclusion
161 An order will go that:
(a) [R.S.] be made a Crown ward without access for the
purpose of adoption.
(b) That the mother will have no access to [A.S.] for the
purpose of adoption.
162 I recognize that this will be a very difficult outcome
for the mother. She demonstrated her love for the
children and did the very best she could. It appears that
she will likely have an open adoption arrangement for
[A.S.]. The mother is a good candidate for an open
39. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [199812 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
40. Des Rosiers, supra note 36, at 58-62.
41. Id. at 60.
42. Id. at61.
43. Id. at 62.
44. Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. S.(S.), [2010] 0.1. No. 5893 (Can.).
45. Pursuant to s. 57 of Ontario's CFSA, supra note 4, a court has a number of options for disposition once
a child has been found to be in need of protection. The most extreme option is Crown Wardship, which transfers
the custody of the child completely to the State.
Fall 2011
9
: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Child Protection
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2011
Barry Law Review
adoption arrangement for [R.S.] as well. The mother has
demonstrated that she is willing to work co-operatively
with the children's caregivers and is unlikely to undermine
any future placement.
163 This order does not preclude the society, in its capacity as
custodial parent of Crown wards, from permitting the
mother to visit the children prior to an adoption. The
society will have full control over any contact that the
mother has with them....
164 It is also important for the mother to know that this
decision does not preclude her from caring for any
children whom she may have in the future. The long lapse
of time since the children came into care, the special
needs of the children and the fact that she is just
recently making gains with her considerable issues has
necessitated this result. The mother has a lot of positive
qualities, as outlined in this decision. She is strongly
encouraged to continue her treatment with Dr. Werry and
participate in any after-care treatment recommended by
Beacon House. It would be helpful for her to address her
use of drugs in her therapy and to obtain domestic violence
counselling. She will need to establish that she can sustain
stability in her life and in her relationships. I sincerely
wish her the best in her efforts to meet these challenges.46
This judgment reflects judicial insight into the trauma the decision is likely to
cause the mother in this case. It aims to help her to understand why the outcome
was reached, and it encourages her to continue with her efforts to improve her
situation. The judge attempts to give the mother hope for future parenting roles,
and provides advice about the route she might most profitably follow to make such
future possibilities successful.
Note that in this case, the judge suggests that the mother may be a good
candidate for an open adoption arrangement 47 with respect to both children. Such
46. Catholic Children's Aid Society, O.J. No. 593 at paras. 161-64 (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
47. Section 145.1 of the CFSA, supra note 4, describes the circumstances under which a court may grant an
openness order:
(1) If a child who is a Crown ward is the subject of a plan for adoption, and no access order is in
effect under Part Ill, the society having care and custody of the child may apply to the court for an
openness order in respect of the child at any time before an order for adoption of the child is made
under section 146.
(3) The court may make an openness order under this section in respect of a child if the
court is satisfied that,
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an arrangement would provide the children with opportunities to have contact with
their mother. However, in many cases, an order for Crown Wardship will
completely sever the child's relationship with his or her former guardians.48 Where
this result occurs, children will be left in a similar position to that of adoptees who
were legally disconnected from their biological parents as a result of a voluntary
relinquishment of parental rights. Due to the traditional assumption that an
adoption order should achieve the discontinuance of one family formation and the
formation of a new family unit,4 9 adopted children's ability to discover details
(a) the openness order is in the best interests of the child;
(b) the openness order will permit the continuation of a relationship with a person
that is beneficial and meaningful to the child; and
(c) the following entities and persons have consented to the order:
(i) the society,
(ii) the person who will be permitted to communicate with or have a
relationship with the child if the order is made,
(iii) the person with whom the society has placed or plans to place the
child for adoption, and
(iv) the child if he or she is 12 years of age or older.
The CFSA further provides for the possibility of an Openness Agreement being entered into between adoptive
parents and biological parents:
153.6 (1) For the purposes of facilitating communication or maintaining relationships, an
openness agreement may be made by an adoptive parent of a child or by a person with
whom a society or licensee has placed or plans to place a child for adoption and any of the
following persons:
I. A birth parent, birth relative or birth sibling of the child.
(2) An openness agreement may be made at any time before or after an adoption order is
made.
48. CFSA, supr/l note 4, at s. 59. In fact, in Ontario, there is a presumption that there will be no:access
where Crown Wardship is ordered:
(2) Where the court makes an order that a child be made a ward of the Crown, any order
for access made under this Part with respect to the child is terminated.
(2.1) A court shall not make or vary an access order . . . with respect to a Crown ward
unless the court is satisfied that,
(a) the relationship between the person and the child is beneficial and meaningful
to the child; and
(b) the ordered access will not impair the child's future opportunities for
adoption.
For a discussion of these provisions, see Elizabeth McCarty, Crown Wardship and Access: The Impact of the
Amendments to the Child and Family Services Act in Ontario, 27 CAN. FAM. L.Q. 129 (2008).
49. Section 158 (2) of the CFSA, supra note 4, declares the following:
For all purposes of law, as of the date of the making of an adoption order,
(a) the adopted child becomes the child of the adoptive parent and the adoptive
parent becomes the parent of the adopted child; and
(b) the adopted child ceases to be the child of the person who was his or her
parent before the adoption order was made and that person ceases to be the
parent of the adopted child, except where the person is the spouse of the
adoptive parent.
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about their biological roots, and to get a clear sense of why they were not
maintained within the original birth family, has been curtailed.50 Even where
certain information does become available to adoptees, the fact that they were
made a Crown Ward and adopted afterward is unlikely to give them a full sense of
the struggle their parent(s) faced or the emotional bonds that existed between
parent(s) and child. Studies continue to show that discovering information
associated with their biological parents is extremely significant to the emotional
well-being of many adoptees. 51 Having access to judicial reasoning that
demonstrates the parent's strengths, weaknesses, and desires may assist the child to
understand and accept the adoption that followed the decision.
The judicial exercise of "therapeutic" judgment writing can be strongly
supported by lawyers. Both written and oral communications with judges should be
aimed at ensuring the client's perspective is heard, articulating clearly and with
detail the positive attitudes and activities that the client has adopted, and working
to ensure that the client has the best opportunities available to access supportive
programs, understand his or her child's needs, and work toward developing the
capacity to meet those needs to the greatest extent possible.
IV. THE COMPLEXITIES INTRODUCED BY THE INTERDISCIPLINARITY OF
CHILD PROTECTION MATTERS
Lawyers and judges are, of course, not the only professionals involved in child
protection matters. It has been noted that "[a]ttomeys, counselors, social workers
and others are recognizing that clients may present issues that transcend the scope
and purpose of a single profession." 52 In virtually all child protection cases, social
workers play a key role, and in at least some matters, psychologists, psychiatrists,
and physicians are also intricately involved. While all of these professionals are
committed to assisting the children at the center of the cases and their parents,
differences in perspective and terminology can actually hinder the progression of
the matter.
For example, as noted earlier, a lawyer will develop a theory of the case based
on the desired outcome for the client. This theory of the case may lead the lawyer
to look for evidence that supports the theory, and to downplay contrary evidence. A
doctor, on the other hand, tends to rule out possibilities as more evidence becomes
available. The doctor's ability to find that the available evidence is consistent with
one or more alternative conclusions may be frustrating to the lawyer who is
50. In Ontario, a number of legislative amendments to the Child and Family Services Act, have been
enacted and repealed in an attempt to achieve the appropriate balance between the privacy traditionally associated
with adoption and adoption records, and the desire of adoptees to access information about their parents. The
current framework for disclosure of information contained within adoption records is set out in Adoption
Information Disclosure 0. Reg. 464/07 (Can.).
51. See Ulrich Muller & Barbara Perry, Adopted Persons' Search for Contact with Their Birth Parents,
4:3 ADOPTION Q. (2001) (for a review of a number of empirical studies about adoptees' search for information
about their birth families).
52. Jeffrey R. Baker, Necessary Third Parties: Multidisciplinary Collaboration and Inadequate
Professional Privileges in Domestic Violence Practice, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 283, 283 (2011).
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seeking to validate evidence that is consistent with his or her "theory." Likewise,
the lawyer's insistence on a definitive diagnosis may be frustrating to the doctor.
Social workers adopt yet another approach. Often the first point of contact with
families, they gauge the severity of the situation, consider the required intervention
for the family through their own particular cultural/socio-economic screens, and
often (depending on the structure of the child protection regime in a particular
jurisdiction) must find ways to balance their role of assisting the family with that of
potentially being required to gather evidence in relation to protection proceedings.
Lawyers' questioning may be difficult for social workers. One author has
commented: "While their work is obviously essential to the system, the movement
of family problems to the legal arena places them in a world that is both foreign
and uncomfortable. For the most part, social workers have been poorly trained to
enter this 'legal' world."
5 3
Different approaches to defining54 and solving problems can create delays as
each professional struggles to understand and respond to the approach of the other.
The differences can also foster distrust among professionals. Surely this is not a
therapeutic outcome. Delays will, in most cases, translate directly into children
being separated from their parents for longer periods of time. It is important for
professionals to communicate in order to better understand each other's language
and objectives.
55
Concern about communication among professionals exists in another more
narrow, yet significant area. In tragic circumstances where a child dies under
suspicious circumstances, there will often be resulting parallel criminal and child
protection investigations.56 In such cases, post-mortem examinations may provide
information about the cause of death that can be relevant to both the criminal and
potential child protection proceedings. And yet, because the proceedings are
separate, the sharing of relevant information has not traditionally been assured. A
2008 inquiry into pediatric forensic pathology in the Province of Ontario was ttold
that "children's aid societies sometimes have had to litigate against the police
to obtain information from ongoing criminal investigations in order to carry out
the appropriate child protection investigations."57  One of the inquiry's
recommendations was that the Province of Ontario should develop more
53. Mary Kay Kisthardt, Working in the Best Interest of Children: Facilitating the Collaboration of
Lawyers and Social Workers in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 30 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 45 (2006); see also Robert G.
Madden & Raymie H. Wayne, Social Work and the Law: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, 48:3 Soc.
WORK 338 (2003) (for another account of the potential collaborative work that could fruitfully be undertaken by
social workers and lawyers).
54. Kisthardt, supra note 53 (noting that while social work discourse focuses on "helping", lawyers focus
on "rights" and whereas social work language stresses interdependence, lawyers' language is focused on
individualism and vindicating individual positions).
55. See Paul Johnson & Katharine Cahn, Improving Child Welfare Practice Through Improvements in
Attorney-Social Worker Relationships, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 229 (1992) (for a discussion of one interdisciplinary
program providing cross-disciplinary training between lawyers and social workers).
56. Freeman, supra note 11, at 41 (describing a situation where police and child welfare systems interacted
in the case of a family losing a baby to sudden infant death syndrome).
57. STEVEN T. GOUDGE, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO 575
(2008) (referring to information provided by Professor Nicholas Bala).
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comprehensive province-wide standards on sharing information arising out of
58investigations of child deaths by police and children's aid societies. Reflecting
the concern raised earlier in this article about uncertainty in relation to various
particular professional roles, one of the elements of the recommended provincial
standards was that they should "articulate the roles to be played by coroners,
forensic pathologists, and Crown counsel in the sharing of information in
investigations . . . ,59 Presumably, information-sharing standards decrease delays
for all involved, and allow all of the professionals engaged with the family at issue
to work in a more fully informed manner. This, in turn, leads to clients being more
informed about the matters at stake, and, correspondingly, to play a greater role in
responding to the concerns raised. It is hoped that province-wide standards will be
expanded as recommended by the inquiry report.
CONCLUSION
The complexity of child protection matters, and the interaction of individuals
involved in this area, call out for continuing efforts to ensure that legal rights and
other human needs are balanced in a manner that most effectively supports families
who are dealing with state intervention into their child-rearing functions. This
balancing includes having lawyers employ preventive lawyering techniques,
having judges work with clients to motivate, educate, and guide them, and when
the outcome of court cases is negative, provide families with feedback that will
assist them to move on in the healthiest manner possible. It also involves having all
professionals involved in child protection matters strive to understand each other's
language and perspective. Each of these initiatives requires hard work. Law
schools and other professional schools need to better educate their students about
the inter-disciplinarity of this line of work. Lawyers with more experience need to
mentor child protection lawyers with less experience. Judicial education needs to
focus on therapeutic approaches. Joint continuing education initiatives among child
protection professionals need to occur. While positive moves have taken place,
there is still much work to be done. Few would argue against the proposition that
emotionally and physically healthy children are essential to a thriving society.
Supporting healthy families for these children is equally essential. Complex
problems often require multi-faceted, sensitive responses. We must begin to
develop these responses within law school and other program curricula. Finally, we
must evaluate the effectiveness of initiatives at each juncture of the process so that
we have a sense of their therapeutic impact.
58. Id. at 576-77.
59. Id. at 577.
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